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XII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Challenges to Federal Water Pollution Control Regulations
The federal government first became involved in water pollution
control in 1899 with the enactment of section 13 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act.' Section 13, known as the Refuse Act, prohibited discharge
of refuse matter of any kind into navigable waters.2 Although the primary
purpose of the 1899 Act was to aid navigation, the prohibitions also
served to prevent egregious pollution by requiring limited discharge
permits.3
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(FWPCA)4 focused on elimination of the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters5 and established a goal of physically, chemically, and
biologically clean waters for the nation by 1985.6 The FWPCA also
established the interim goal of water quality suitable for recreation and
sufficient to support the habitation and propagation of fish and wildlife
by 1983.1 The 1972 amendments to the FWPCA directed the
Rivers and Harbors Act, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899).
Id. The Refuse Act prohibits both the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters of
the United States, and the placement of material of any kind along the banks of navigable
waters where that material might be washed into the water by high tide or storm, thereby
obstructing navigation. Id.
3 Id. Upon the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, the Secretary of the Army
may issue a permit for the deposit of restricted materials in navigable waters. Id. For a
discussion of the history of water pollution control legislation, see Note, The Clean Water
Act of 1977: Great Expectations Unrealized, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 259 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Great Expectations].
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3668, 3675. Before the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA), the focus of pollution control legislation was on monitoring of water quality
of interstate streams by the states. The 1972 amendments focused on individual polluters,
setting effluent limitations for each discharger. Id. "Pollutant" includes sewage, chemical
and biological materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, and dirt. 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6) (1976). "Discharge of pollutants" is defined as the addition of pollutants to
navigable waters from any point source other than a vessel or floating craft. Id. § 1362(12)
(1976). Any discrete conveyance from which pollutants are or may be discharged is a "point
source." Examples include pipes, tunnels, containers, and vessels. Id. § 1362(14) (Supp. I
1977). "Navigable waters" are the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.
Id. § 1362(1) (1976). Under the FWPCA, courts interpret the term navigable waters liberally
to include any tributary feeding into a navigable waterway that might affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
Id. § 1251(a)(2). Section 1311 prohibits the discharge of any pollutant into the nation's waters except in conformance with the FWPCA. Id. § 1311(a). The Act requires nonmunicipal point sources to meet effluent limitations established by the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by July 1, 1977. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A); see id. § 1314
(1976 & Supp. I 1977). The 1977 limitations are those determined by the EPA to be achievable through use of the best practicable control technology available (BPT) for the regulated
industry subcategory. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976). The interim goals for 1983 are to be
2
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Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to develop
and publish regulations detailing guidelines for effluent limitations within
one year of enactment." The Clean Water Act of 19779 further amended
the FWPCA by altering the enforcement duties of the Administrator.10
As a means of controlling pollution under the FWPCA, the EPA
Administrator or an approved state agency, issues permits under the
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) to individual
industrial and municipal point sources that are discharging waste water
into the nation's navigable waters.11 If an individual discharger cannot
meet the established limitations for pollution, the discharger may obtain
a variance from the established standards. 2 A discharger operating under
a permit with a variance is deemed to be in compliance with the law.' s
The Administrator's decision to issue or deny an NPDES permit is
among several actions reviewable in the United States courts of appeals
achieved by application of the best available control technology (BAT) economically achievable for the industry subcategory which will result in reasonable further progress toward the
1985 goal. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A).
a Id. § 1314(b). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), id. §§ 1251-1376
(1976), was enacted October 18, 1972. Regulations were to be published by October 18, 1973.
Id. § 1314(b).
9 Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. I
1977)).
10 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. I 1977). The Clean Water Act provided the Administrator
with alternatives to enforcement action under the FWPCA. In contrast to the strict compliance deadline in the FWPCA, the Clean Water Act afforded the Administrator the option of
extending the 1977 BPT compliance deadline to April 1, 1979, if the discharger had acted in
good faith, if the extension did not result in the imposition of additional controls on any
other pollution sources, if the application for extension was timely filed, and if facilities
necessary for compliance were under construction. The 1977 amendments also allow the
Administrator to issue an enforcement order which includes a schedule for compliance. Id. §
1319 (1976) (Supp. 1 1977). See generallyKalur, Will JudicialErrorAllow IndustrialPoint
Sources to Avoid BPT and PerhapsBAT Later? A Story of Good Intentions, Bad Dictum,
and Ugly Consequences, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 955, 978 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Kalur]; Comment, Federal Enforcement Proceedings Under the 1977 Clean Water Act, 51 TEMP. L.Q.
884 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Enforcement].
"133 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1345 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). The National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) provides for lawful exemptions from the no-discharge rule of
§ 1311. An entity engaged in any activity which may result in the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters must apply for a permit to discharge. The applicant must certify that
any discharge resulting from its activity will comply with applicable effluent limitations for
its subcategory. Id. § 1341(a)(1) (Supp. I 1977); see note 7 supra.
12 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). The Administrator may vary the requirements of §
1311(b)(2)(A) (BAT 1983 standards) for any point sources from which it receives an application for relief. Id. § 1311(c). The FWPCA does not specifically allow variances from the 1977
BPT standards. See notes 68-71 infra. The EPA regulations establishing effluent limitations
for industry subcategories, however, provide for variances for individual industry facilities.
To obtain a variance the individual discharger must submit evidence to the permit issuer to
demonstrate that factors applying to its operation are "fundamentally different" from those
considered by the Administrator in establishing the industry-wide limitations. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 436.22 (1979) (variance provision for crushed stone industry subcategory).
13 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (1976).
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under the FWPCA. 4 Approval or promulgation of effluent limitations
under the FWPCA is also reviewable in the federal circuit courts.1" The
Fourth Circuit recently heard challenges to FWPCA effluent limitation
regulations in National Crushed Stone Association v. EPA6 and
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle.17 In these two cases, the court upheld
certain pollution control regulations and remanded others to the EPA for
reconsideration and possible revision.' 8
In its review of the EPA regulations, the Fourth Circuit employed the
standards for judicial review of agency action prescribed by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).19 Under the APA's narrow review
'4 Id.
§ 1369(b)(1). The enumeration of actions of the Administrator that are reviewable
in the circuit courts does not preclude judicial review of other agency action deemed to be
final. Washington v. EPA, 573 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1978). Any action determined to be a
final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,
701-706 (1976), is reviewable in a federal district court unless a statute granting consent to
be sued, such as the FWPCA, expressly or impliedly forbids the relief sought. Id. § 702
(1976). Legislative intent to prohibit judicial review must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). In the case of the
FWPCA, the House Committee Report explicitly rejected any intent to deny judicial review
of provisions other than those enumerated in 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (1976). H.R. REP. No. 911,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 136 (1972); see Currie, Judicial Review Under the Federal Pollution
Laws, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1221, 1225 (1977).
15 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1976). Section 1369 expressly provides for judicial review of
actions of the Administrator under §§ 1311, 1312, or 1316. Id. Effluent limitation guidelines
are developed under § 1314. Id. § 1314. Prior to 1977 courts were split three ways on the
reviewability of effluent guidelines. Compare CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032, 1037-38
(8th Cir. 1975) (EPA lacks authority to issue effluent limitation regulations and § 1314
"guidelines" are reviewable in district courts) with American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540
F.2d 1023, 1030 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (EPA has authority to
issue effluent limitation guidelines but court held them only "presumptively applicable" to
individual sources) and Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 628 (2d Cir.
1976) (EPA has authority to issue effluent limitation regulations which individual plants
may not exceed). In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), the
Supreme Court noted the potential for inconsistent rulings caused by disallowing review of §
1314 standards in the circuit courts. Thus, the Court held that effluent guidelines developed
under § 1314 were within the definition of "regulations" covered by § 1311 and that the
guidelines were reviewable in the circuit courts. Id. at 136.
-6 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3513.
.7 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. granted sub nom. EPA v. National Crushed Stone
Ass'n, 48 U.S.L.W. 3513.
" The FWPCA required the EPA Administrator to develop effluent limitation regulations for 27 categories of polluters based upon technology applicable to each industry. 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1976). Section 1311(b) lists categories of industry polluters to be regulated
by the FWPCA. In developing the regulations, the EPA divided the enumerated industry
categories into subcategories and established numerical pollutant discharge limitations for
each subcategory. 40 C.F.R., Parts 402-460 (1979). The effluent limitation regulations remanded in National Crushed Stone appear at 40 C.F.R. §§ 436.22(a) (crushed stone),
436.32(a) (construction sand and gravel) (1979). The Fourth Circuit also reviewed variance
provisions for crushed stone, construction sand and gravel, and three subcategories of the
coal industry. See text accompanying notes 66-78 & 103-116 infra.
1-9 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for review of agency action made reviewable by statute, and for review of agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy. Id. § 704.
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standard, a court may overrule an agency only if the agency's action is
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,20 or if the agency fails to observe procedure required
by law. 21 In addition, a court will set aside any action which exceeds the
agency's statutory authority.22 If an agency has acted properly in enacting
judgment on the
a regulation, the court may not substitute its own
23
propriety of the regulation for that of the agency.
Agency action in rulemaking is guided by section 4 of the APA2' which
imposes three obligations on an administrator. The administrator must
give notice of his intended rulemaking, give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the action by submitting written views, and
incorporate in the final rules a statement of their basis and purposes. 25 In
National Crushed Stone and Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed several EPA rulemaking decisions and ruled on both the
procedures followed by the EPA in promulgation of the challenged
27
regulations28 and the impact of those regulations.
National Crushed Stone Association v. EPA
In National Crushed Stone, industry petitioners challenged
substantive provisions of the EPA regulations for the crushed stone and
the construction sand and gravel industry subcategories of the mineral
mining and processing point source category. 28 The petitioners asserted
that the EPA failed to follow procedures established by the FWPCA29
and acted contrary to APA rulemaking requirements.3 0 In addition,
industry petitioners claimed that the variance provisions" in the
regulations were inconsistent with the recent Fourth Circuit decision in
AppalachianPower Co. v. Train (AppalachianII).32
20

Id. § 706(2)(A).

21 Id. § 706(2)(D).
22 Id. § 706(2)(C).
23 See, e.g., Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
24 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
21 Id. §§ 553(b), 553(c); see Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process.The Limits of JudicialReview, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375, 380 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wright]. In
interpreting the notice requirement, courts have not required detailed findings of fact, but

they have demanded explanations for controversial normative and empirical determinations
made by the agency. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA (Appalachian1). 477 F.2d
495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973).
28 See text accompanying notes 33-39 infra. The procedure followed in issuing effluent

limitations was challenged in National Crushed Stone. 601 F.2d at 115-18.
27 See text accompanying notes 57-64 & 112-116 infra. In both National Crushed Stone
and ConsolidationCoal, the Fourth Circuit applied APA judicial review standards to challenged EPA regulations. 604 F.2d at 243; 601 F.2d at 116.
28 40 C.F.R. § 436.22 (1979) (crushed stone); id. § 436.32 (construction sand and gravel).
2- 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976). Section 1251(e)'requires the Administrator to accomodate
and encourage public participation in the development of pollution control regulations.
20
21

2

601 F.2d at 116; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
See note 12 supra; notes 68-71 infra.
601 F.2d at 116; see Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (AppalachianI1), 545 F.2d 1351

(4th Cir. 1976).
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The EPA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking for the crushed
stone and the construction sand and gravel subcategories along with
"interim final" regulations in June, 1976."3 The notice provided interested
persons an opportunity for comment. During the comment period,
industry petitioners offered numerous comments on the interim
regulations.3 4 After the close of the comment period and before the
issuance of final regulations, 3 5 however, the EPA received additional data
developed by a private contractor, Versar, Inc. 6 On the basis of the
Versar data, the EPA made significant changes in the effluent limitation
regulations.3 7 Industry officials learned of the existence of the Versar data
at a conference with EPA officials in March, 1977, but the EPA refused
industry officials access to the information until after the promulgation of
final regulations.3 8 The petitioners claimed that the EPA's refusal to
share its data with industry representatives violated the APA. s9
The petitioners also challenged the substance of the final
regulations. 40 Following issuance of final regulations, the petitioners
secured a report by an independent engineer which raised serious
questions about the sufficiency of the Versar data as a basis for the new
regulations and about the statistical validity of the data.41 The
independent engineer's report questioned whether the EPA had given
sufficient consideration to the technical feasibility and economic impact
of the more restrictive final regulations. "2
The EPA admitted that it relied on the Versar data in promulgating
the final regulations, and that industry petitioners were not afforded an
opportunity to examine the data prior to final promulgation.'3 The
" 41 Fed. Reg. 23,552 (1976). Because the EPA was unable to develop and promulgate
effluent limitation regulations within the statutorily established time period, rulemaking
procedures were judicially altered. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 501
F.2d 692, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Under the court-imposed schedule, the EPA issues "interim final" regulations with its notice of proposed rulemaking. The "interim final" regulations
are effective immediately, but subject to revision after a 30-day comment period. American
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 1977).
34 601 F.2d at 116-17.
35 42 Fed. Reg. 35,843-52 (1977) (issuance of final regulations).
" 601 F.2d at 116-17. Versar, Inc. developed data based on a review of NPDES permits
at two EPA regional offices. The comment period for the interim regulations ended in August, 1976. The Versar data was submitted to the EPA in February, 1977. Id.
11 Id. at 117. The interim regulations permitted the discharge of water from industry
facilities so long as total suspended solids (TSS), both organic and inorganic, did not exceed
30 miligrams per liter (mg/l) of waste water output for any one day. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,552,
23,558-59 (1976). Final regulations raised the maximum mine water effluent limitation to a
permissible discharge of 45 mg/l per day but established a 30-day average limitation of 25
mg/l. 40 C.F.R. §§ 436.22(a)(1) (crushed stone), 436.32(a)(1) (construction sand and gravel)
(1979).
601 F.2d at 117.
' Id. at 116; see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
40 601 F.2d at 118.
41 Id.
42 Id.

41 See id. at 117.
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justification offered by the EPA for its reliance on the Versar data was
that the increased daily limits of'total suspended solids (TSS) discharge
allowed in the final regulations were in accordance with industry
comments received on the interim regulations. The EPA, however, did
not justify the inclusion of a monthly average TSS limitation in the final
regulations.44
Because the FWPCA requires the maximum possible public
45
participation in the development of water pollution control regulations
and because the APA requires the agency to explicate fully its rulemaking
actions, 46 the Fourth Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to allow industry
inspection of and comment upon the Versar data was a critical defect in
the decision makdng process.' 7 In remanding the TSS effluent limitations

to the EPA for full consideration of industry comments,4 8 the court relied
on Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus,49 a case whose facts
paralleled those presented in National Crushed Stone. As a further
reason for remand, the Fourth Circuit noted that the EPA had failed to
explain fully its reasons for changing the effluent limitations.50 The court
held this failure to comply with required procedures to be fatal under the
APA.5 2
Besides the TSS limitation regulations, industry petitioners
challenged the introduction of a waste water recycling requirement, 52 a
44 Id. at 118. The EPA argued that the 30-day average restriction of 25 mg/I was harmless because of the increased daily discharge allowance. This conclusion was challenged by
the industry, and the EPA offered no evidence to support its position. Id.
45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976).
43 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976); see Appalachian I, 477 F.2d at 507.
47 601 F.2d at 117.
48 Id. at 119.
40 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied 417 U.S. 921 (1974). In PortlandCement,
the court set aside regulations which had previously been remanded to the EPA for reconsideration. Test information which the EPA had used to justify the initial regulations was
refuted by an independent engineer. Id. at 393. On remand, the EPA included the independent data in its record without comment. Since the independent data was determined to be
of possible significance in the test results, and the EPA had refused to respond to the engineer's challenges, the court found that the EPA had wrongfully based its regulations on data
known only to the Agency, and had failed to respond adequately to industry comments. Id.

:0 601 F.2d at 119.
1 Id. Under the APA, an agency action not in accordance with law or procedure must
be set aside. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976). The Fourth Circuit has held that attempts at explaining agency action after the regulations are promulgated are insufficient to cure non-compliance with stated principles. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1026
(4th Cir. 1976), af'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 430 U.S. 112 (1977).
52 601 F.2d at 119. The EPA tied a no-discharge provision to the recycling requirement
in the final regulations. Under the interim regulations, construction sand and gravel facilities were allowed to discharge mine water provided they met established TSS effluent limitations. 41 Fed. Reg. 23,552, 23,560 (1976). Under the final regulations, neither industry
could discharge effluents unless the discharging facility engaged in recycling. 40 C.F.R. §§
436.22(a)(2) (crushed stone), 436.32(a)(2) (construction sand and gravel) (1979). The court
remanded the no-discharge requirements along with the recycling regulations, reasoning
that the no-discharge provisions were not meant to stand alone and that the EPA should
have the opportunity to reconsider them concurrently with its reconsideration of the recycling provisions. 601 F.2d at 121-22. See text accompanying notes 53-64 infra.
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second major change that first appeared in the final regulations.5e The
interim regulations did not require recycling of any sort for either
industry subcategory, but many facilities in the crushed stone industry
practiced recycling because of the regulations' no-discharge rule.5 ' During
the comment period, the crushed stone industry sought final regulations
permitting the discharge of waste water without recycling. 5 Without
notice to the industry, however, the EPA enacted a waste water recycling
requirement encompassing both the crushed stone and the construction
sand and gravel industries."
The foundation of the petitioners' challenge to the recycling
provisions of the final regulations was a claim that implementation of the
recycling technology would not result in decreased pollution. 57 The
petitioners claimed that, in fact, the best practicable technology (BPT) is
not recycling, but use of a settling pond and discharge of the settled
process generated water without recycling. 58 The EPA conceded that the
addition of the recycling requirement would be costly and burdensome to
industry facilities, and the Agency was unable to refute petitioners'
"The interim regulation divided discharge water into two components, "mine dewatering" and "process generated" waste water. 41 Fed. Reg. at 23,558 (1976) (interim regulations-crushed stone), id. at 23,558-59 (interim regulations-construction sand and gravel).
Interim regulations prohibited discharge of process generated water in the crushed stone
subcategory. Id. at 23,558 (interim regulations-crushed stone). The crushed stone industry
could meet the no-discharge requirement by returning process generated waste water to a
settling pond and then reusing the settled clear water in the production cycle. Id. at 23,554
(interim regulations). Recycling was specifically mentioned in the regulations as a possible
technology which would enable the crushed stone industry to comply with the no-discharge
requirements, but it was not required for the industry. Interim regulations for the construction sand and gravel subcategory specifically rejected recycling as a required technology for
that industry subcategory and allowed discharge of process generated waste water because
of an industry practice of commingling mine water and process generated water in the same
settling pond. The interim regulations permitted discharge of the commingled waters subject to the same TSS limitation as mine dewatering. Id. at 23,559 (interim regulations-construction sand and gravel).
Final regulations for both subcategories provided for discharge of process generated
waste water according to the TSS limitations established for mine dewatering; only those
facilities which recycled waste water were allowed to discharge. Facilities that did not recycle were held to a no-discharge provision. 40 C.F.R. §§ 436.22(a)(1), 436.32(a)(1) (1979).
The definition of "process generated" waste water was expanded, however, to encompass
commingled waters which, under the interim regulations, could be discharged regardless of
whether a facility recycled its process waters. Id. § 436.21(b).
54 41 Fed. Reg. at 23,558 (1976) (interim regulations-crushed stone).
55 601 F.2d at 120.
86 Id.
57 In addition to the technical challenge to the final regulations, the petitioners challenged the recycling requirement as fatally vague. Id. Neither the term "recycling" nor the
breadth of its application is defined anywhere in the final regulations. The lack of a clear
definition of an essential term could render the regulations void for vagueness, E.I. du Pont
de Nemours v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018, 1033 (4th Cir. 1976), and the court noted this vagueness as a contributing factor in its decision to remand the recycling regulations. 601 F.2d at
120.
" 601 F.2d at 121.

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

1980]

claims of an alternative BPT.5 9
The Fourth Circuit remanded the recycling provisions primarily
because of EPA's failure to show any environmental benefit from the
adoption of the recycling technology.6 0 Relying on its earlier decision in
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train6 the Fourth Circuit noted that
the EPA must consider the total environmental impact when requiring
alterations in industry operations.6 2 The court held that if the EPA
cannot show an environmental benefit from the adoption of its prescribed
techniques, then it has not shown that the required alteration is in fact
the best practicable pollution control technology available.0 3 The court
concluded that if the EPA had data to support its recycling requirement,
its reliance on that data should be clearly explained in the rulemaking
record."
The final major question 5 raised by the petitioners for the
construction sand and gravel and the crushed stone industry
subcategories concerned variance provisions in the regulations.66 ' Under
the FWPCA, the Administrator may modify the 1983 effluent limitation
standards upon application of an industry facility,67 but the 1977 (BPT)
standards are not subject to any variance under the statute. The
regulations promulgated by the Administrator, however, allowed
individual facilities in each industry subcategory to apply for variance
from the BPT standards.6 8 In Appalachian 11,69 the Fourth Circuit
5' Id.
6o Id.
81 541 F.2d 1018, 1034 (4th Cir. 1976).
82

601 F.2d at 121.

63

Id.

Id.; see Appalachian II, 545 F.2d at 1364.
The petitioners also challenged the EPA's change in the regulatory definition of process generated waste water and the timing of the regulations. 601 F.2d at 124. The final
regulations expanded the definition of process generated waste water to include commingled
waters. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 436.21(e) (crushed stone), 436.31(e) (construction sand and gravel)
(1979). This change affected both recycling and discharge provisions. See note 53 supra.
Petitioners claimed that the expanded definition was so different from the one in the interim regulations that it should be set aside as a significant change in the regulations without notice to the industry. 601 F.2d at 124; see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra. The
court did not find the definition invalid on its face, and declined to act until the definition
could be considered in the context of new recycling and discharge regulations. 601 F.2d at
125. The court upheld the regulatory definition without prejudice to raise the matter in a
subsequent petition after the EPA's reconsideration of remanded regulations. Id.
The court also declined to take action against the EPA on the timeliness of the regulations. Final regulations were issued on July 12, 1977, to become effective August 12, 1977.
The statutory deadline for compliance with BPT regulations was July 1, 1977. The court
acknowledged that the timing of the regulations raised serious questions, but declined to
rule on those questions because the regulations were remanded on other grounds. Id.
601 F.2d at 124; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 436.22 (crushed stone), 436.32 (construction sand
and gravel) (1979).
67 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976).
'6 E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 436.22 (1979) (crushed stone subcategory). In developing effluent
limitation regulations, the EPA developed data pertinent to each industry subcategory and
65
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upheld the concept of a variance clause for BPT standards, 0 but found
the clause developed by the EPA to be too restrictive 11
The petitioners in National Crushed Stone attacked the crushed
stone and construction sand and gravel variance provisions as contrary to
the holding of Appalachian II.72 The EPA argued that review of the
variance provisions would be premature prior to any actual industry
request for a variance, and that Appalachian II, therefore, would not
apply.73 In Appalachian II, the Fourth Circuit proceeded with its review
of variance provisions because of the EPA's unmistakeable position on
variance requests.74 In National Crushed Stone, the court acknowledged
that the EPA had changed its position on variance provisions after
Appalachian II,7 and that the Agency's actions might have resolved the
established discharge limitations accordingly. The regulations allow for reconsideration of
the applicability of the subcategory limitations when an individual discharger can show that
factors relating to equipment, facilities, processes, or "other such factors" affecting its own
facility are fundamentally different from the factors the EPA considered in establishing the
limitations. Id. The same language appears in all industry subcategory variance provisions.
The EPA has been criticized for limiting its variance review to technical and engineering
factors, and the variance provisions for at least one subcategory have been remanded to the
EPA for reconsideration. See text accompanying notes 69-71 infra.
6- 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976).
70 Id. at 1358. The Fourth Circuit originally authorized BPT variances in the Du Pont
case. 541 F.2d at 1029. Reasoning that the 1977 BPT standards are only presumptively applicable to particular industry facilities, the Du Pont court accepted variance provisions as a
valid method of adapting the standards to individual facilities. Id. Although the court's reasoning in Du Pont has been criticized, see Kalur, supra note 10, at 696-70, other courts have
relied on the authority of the Fourth Circuit's Du Pont decision in their approval of variance provisions. Id. at 672.
71 545 F.2d at 1359. In Appalachian II, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the variance provision in a case challenging the EPA's water pollution control regulations for the steam electric power generating point source category. Id. at 1358; see 40 C.F.R., Part 423 (1979). The
court found that the EPA utilized a very narrow interpretation of the language of the variance provision. See note 68 supra. Noting that economic factors were considered in establishing the 1977 limitations, and that economic factors may be considered in granting a
variance from the 1983 standards, the court reasoned that economic factors should also be
considered in evaluating an application for variance from the 1977 standards. The court
concluded that the factors taken into consideration for granting a variance from the standard ought to be at least as broad as the factors relied upon in establishing the standard,
and that the variance clause as written and applied was too restrictive. 545 F.2d at 1359.

601 F.2d at 122.
Id.
7" 545 F.2d at 1359.
72

73

75 601 F.2d at 123. The Fourth Circuit noted two Agency actions which reflected the
EPA's shifting position. First, in 1977, in an Administrator's case decision, the EPA specifically cited .AppalachianI. In re Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 10 ENvRON. CAS. (BNA) 1841,
1842 (1977). In Louisiana-Pacific, the California State Water Resources Control Board
sought variances for dischargers, claiming, inter alia, that the costs of compliance for the
dischargers in question, when considered against water quality factors, would justify a variance. Id. at 1844. While the Administrator rejected California's individualized cost-benefit
arguments, he clearly accepted cost differentials as pertinent in granting a variance for a
particular point source. Id. at 1854. Second, the court took note of the EPA's formal withdrawal of previous interpretations of variance provisions inconsistent with Appalachian II.
601 F.2d at 123; see 43 Fed. Reg. 50,042 (1978).
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variance issue."6 Based on its interpretation of an EPA position paper,
however, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the EPA's actions were
inadequate to bring the provisions into conformity with AppalachianII,"
provisions for rewording to comply with the
and remanded the variance
8
Appalachian II decision.7

Decisions on the technical, environmental aspects of FWPCA
regulations generally have little, if any, effect on substantive regulations
in other industry subcategories.7 Neither the Fourth Circuit nor any
other court has previously reviewed the effluent limitation regulations for
the construction sand and gravel subcategory or for the crushed stone
subcategory. The Fourth Circuit's action in National Crushed Stone was
consistent with its previous decisions8" and with decisions in other
circuits concerning similar issues raised by other industries. 81
601 F.2d at 123.
7 Id. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the EPA's published withdrawal of inconsistent
opinions to be worded in such a way as to conflict with AppalachianIL Id. In the Agency
position paper, the EPA general counsel noted that the EPA would grant a variance to an
industry facility that could show that its own compliance costs were significantly greater
than the compliance costs considered by the EPA when establishing the regulation. 43 Fed.
Reg. 50,042 (1978). The Fourth Circuit interpreted its Appalachian II decision as requiring
a variance for any facility that cannot achieve compliance by applying the maximum technology within the facility's financial capability. 601 F.2d at 124. The court added that its
construction of the variance provisions is in accordance with that of the D.C. Circuit in
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In fact, the two courts' decisions
differ markedly. The Weyerhaeuser court's conclusion is based on consideration of a facility's costs as compared to those imposed on the industry as a whole. 590 F.2d at 1036.
Weyerhaeuser supports the EPA interpretation of the variance provisions, rather than the
conclusion drawn by the Fourth Circuit.
Is 601 F.2d at 124.
79 See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Because of the technical complexity of the individual standards, the courts educate themselves
in the technicalities of the regulations only to the extent necessary to determine whether the
EPA's action in rulemaking was based on consideration of relevant factors and was free of
any clear error of judgment. Id.
So The Fourth Circuit approached its review of the technical regulations in National
Crushed Stone in the same way it has approached substantive challenges to regulations in
other industries, by checking the Agency record to find adequate support for the Agency's
decision. See Tanner's Council of America, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1188, 1193 (4th Cir. 1976)
(remanding effluent limitations for leather tanning and finishing industry citing insufficient
Agency record); FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978 (4th Cir. 1976) (remanding plastics
and synthetics point source effluxent limitations because EPA failed to substantiate bases for
limitations); text accompanying notes 40-64 supra.
a' Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1268 (9th Cir. 1977) (EPA did not show
conclusively that prescribed TSS limitations could be achieved by application of BPT); California & Hawaiian Sugar Co. v. EPA, 553 F.2d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 1977) (regulations for
crystalline cane sugar refineries upheld as based on adequate technical support); Hooker
Chems. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 632 (2d Cir. 1976) (EPA's consideration of
factors affecting phosphate manufacturing industry was sufficient to uphold BPT effluent
limitations); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1034 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977) (technical regulations for petroleum industry were adequately
supported by record); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 455 (7th Cir. 1975) (regulations for all four subcategories of slaughterhouses and packinghouses upheld because in78
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The administrative issues resolved in National Crushed Stone
concerned the application of APA requirements of notice and full
explication in agency rulemaking.8 2 The Fourth Circuit acted in harmony
with other circuits in requiring that technical data be made available to
the regulated industry" to satisfy both the APA rulemaking procedure8
and the FWPCA requirement for participation in rulemaking.8 5 In
National Crushed Stone, the Fourth Circuit also reviewed procedural
regulations which affect all industry subcategories.86 The court's holding
on the variance provisions followed the groundwork laid in Du Pont 7 and
Appalachian 11.8 Although the Fourth Circuit claimed to be in
accordance with the D.C. Circuit, the final action taken by the two courts
differs substantially. 9 The Fourth Circuit's decision to remand the
variance provisions in National Crushed Stone for rewording will
heighten the conflict between circuits on the availability of variances for
financially strapped industry facilities.8 0
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle,91 the Fourth Circuit heard both
administrative and environmental challenges to FWPCA92 regulations for
the coal mining point source category.93 Industry petitioners challenged
the standard variance clause language in the regulations,9 the lack of an
dustry failed to refute EPA's data on effects of air temperatures on BPT limitations); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1062 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
914 (1978) (new source regulations for by-product coke plants set aside because EPA's basis
for regulations was not adequately demonstrated).
82 601 F.2d at 119; see text accompanying notes 24-25 supra.
8' Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979); Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Ruckeshaus, 486 F.2d at 392.
8 See 601 F.2d at 117.

88 gee id. at 119; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976).
88 See note 68 supra.

541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976); see note 70 supra.
545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying notes 69-78 supra.
88 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see note 77 supra.
88 The D.C. Circuit, in Weyerhaeuser, accepted the EPA's position on variance when a
regulation imposes a greater than normal restriction on a particular facility. 590 F.2d at
1032. After National Crushed Stone, the Fourth Circuit requires a variance for any facility
that is financially incapable of complying with BPT regulations.
81 604 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1979). Consolidation Coal petitioners included 17 coal producers, their trade association, five citizens' environmental associations, and the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. Id. at 242.
8 See text accompanying notes 1-27 supra.
9' See 40 C.F.R., Part 434 (1979) (regulations for coal mining industry category).
84 The FWPCA effluent limitation regulations contain a provision for a variance for a
given facility in the industry subcategory. An individual discharger may submit evidence to
the EPA Regional Administrator to demonstrate that factors affecting the discharger's performance are fundamentally different from the factors considered by the EPA in establishing the regulations. If the Regional Administrator determines that fundamentally different
factors do exist, he or she may establish individualized effluent limitations in the dis87
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environmental quality standard in the variance clauses9 5 the application
of the regulations pertaining to coal preparation plants,98 the exclusion
from the regulations of mines in six western states, 97 and the timing of
the promulgation of the regulations. 8 The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania and citizens groups joined to challenge the exclusion of
post-mining discharges from the industry regulations, and the
construction of the catastrophic rainfall exemption in the regulations."
Narrow standards prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) governed the court's review of the challenged EPA regulations in
Consolidation Coal.100 Since the FWPCA required the EPA to develop
complex pollution control data in a very limited time, the Fourth Circuit
stated that it would be hesitant to contradict the EPA's substantive
conclusions solely because they were developed on a limited data base.10 '
The court recognized that an overly expansive review of the regulations
would impede progress toward elimination of water pollution. 0 2
The industry petitioners' first challenge to the regulations attacked
the variance provisions applicable to the coal mining industries.103
Effluent limitation standards established pursuant to the FWPCA may be
varied by the EPA upon application by an individual industry facility.' 04
The coal industries' regulatory variance provisions are identical to those
promulgated for other industry subcategories. 0 5 Industry petitioners
attacked their variance provisions claiming that the FWPCA requires the
EPA to consider cost factors 05 in permitting variances both from the
1977 standards, which are based on employment of the best practicable
07
and from the 1983 standards, which
control technology available (BPT)1
charger's NPDES permit. E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 434.22 (1979); see text accompanying notes 67-71
supra.
95 604 F.2d at 244.
96 Id. at 249.
7 Id. at 246.
Id. at 245; see text accompanying notes 117-21 infra.
604 F.2d at 250-54.
10 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1976); 604 F.2d at 243; see text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
101 604 F.2d at 243.
102
103

Id.
Id.

Id. n.16; see 40 C.F.R. § 434.22 (1979).
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 434.22 (1979) (coal preparation plants) with 40 C.F.R. § 436.22
(1979) (crushed stone).
106 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976). Section 1311(c) allows variance from 1983 (BAT) standards for facilities that are utilizing pollution control techniques to the maximum extent of
their economic capability. The FWPCA does not provide for variance from 1977 (BPT)
standards, but effluent limitation regulations do allow a BPT variance for a facility that can
demonstrate that it operates under fundamentally different factors than those factors upon
which the EPA based its regulations. See text accompanying note 68 supra. Courts have
determined that cost factors must be included in the EPA's consideration of a variance
application. See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train (AppalachianI1), 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir.
1976); In re Louisiana-Pacific, 10 ENvIRON. CAs. (BNA) 1841, 1852 (1977); FederalEnforcement, supra note 10, at 886.
107 BPT standards are those which should have been attained by July 1, 1977. See note
7 supra.
104
100
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can be achieved only by application of the best available technology
(BAT).10 8 The petitioners argued that the variance clause, as written, did
not require the EPA to consider cost factors in evaluating variance
applications.109 The Fourth Circuit recently reviewed the crushed stone
and construction sand industry variance provisions in National Crushed
Stone and remanded them for revision to include consideration of cost
factors in conformity with its earlier decision in Appalachian 1I.1 ° The
Consolidation Coal court likewise remanded the coal industry variance
provisions for revision to conform with National Crushed Stone.""'
Industry petitioners also challenged the variance provisions on
environmental grounds,1 12 citing the EPA's failure to include a costbenefit analysis of the impact of industry expenditures on the quality of
receiving water in its determination of whether to grant a variance.11 The
Fourth Circuit rejected petitioners' claims that consideration of a
variance request should include an evaluation of the quality of receiving
water. The court reasoned that the FWPCA concentrates on individual
point sources of pollution, eliminating consideration of the quality of
water at any one site.1 ' Poor water quality does not release an individual
facility from the requirement to apply BPT or to meet its own
subcategory effluent limitations.' 5 The Fourth Circuit thus upheld the
variance provisions against petitioners' challenge to the provisions' net
environmental benefits. 1 6
The final regulations for the coal mining industries were promulgated
less than three months before the deadline for compliance with BPT
standards." 1 Because of the timing, industry petitioners considered the
108 BAT standards are the goals for 1983. See note 7 supra.
109 604 F.2d at 243. The language of the variance provisions requires the EPA to con-

sider technical and engineering factors and "other such factors" in evaluating an application
for variance from BPT standards. See note 70 supra.
110 601 F.2d at 124; see text accompanying notes 65-78 supra.
" 604 F.2d at 244.
112 Id.
13 Id. Receiving water is the water into which a facility discharges waste water.
114 604 F.2d at 245. In passing the FWPCA, Congress determined that pollution control
based on overall water quality considerations had been ineffective in combating pollution.
Since 1972, therefore, the federal government has concentrated on development and regulation of effluent reduction technology to achieve the goal of restored waters, rather than on
receiving water quality. See EPA v. California, 426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976); Great Expectations, supra note 3, at 262. Since the FWPCA concentrates on individual point sources, the
Fourth Circuit accordingly has determined that no facility should be required to make improvements in intake water beyond those achievable by application of BPT for the specific
industry in question. In effect, industries receive credit for the quality of their intake water.
Appalachian II, 545 F.2d at 1377-78.
115 Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Appalachian II,
545 F.2d at 1378; In re Louisiana-Pacific, 10 ENWRON. CAS. (BNA) 1841, 1847 (1977).
116 604 F.2d at 245.
117 The statutory deadline for compliance with BPT standards was July 1, 1977. 33
U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976). The challenged regulations for the coal mining industry were
promulgated in April, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 21,380 (1977). The FWPCA required the Administrator to promulgate effluent limitation guidelines for all water polluting industries by Octo-
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regulations unachievable by the required deadline and, therefore,
invalid.11 s The Fourth Circuit upheld the challenged coal industry
standards, however, despite their untimely promulgation. 11 9 Relying on its
interpretation of legislative history of the FWPCA,'20 the court
determined that the Administrator has discretion to grant an extension of
the compliance date in cases in which noncompliance is the result of the
Administrator's delay in promulgating guidelines. 21
The industry also challenged the exclusion of western coal mines from
the application of effluent limitation guidelines.'22 The industry claimed
that postponement of TSS limitations for western coal mines violated the
FWPCA's uniformity requirement. 12 3 Additionally, industry petitioners
asserted that lack of adequate notice of the exclusion of western mines
25
violated both the APA"'4 and the FWPCA.

While acknowledging the statutory requirement of uniformity within
all industry subcategories, the Fourth Circuit found no violation of the
Act in the exclusion of western mines. 126 The court noted that the
FWPCA enables the Administrator to create industry subcategories based
on a broad range of factors 127 and does not prohibit consideration of
ber 18, 1973. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). Because of the overwhelming nature of the task,
the EPA was unable to meet the statutory schedule. The result of this inability to develop
all the required regulations was a court-imposed, court-supervised timetable for promulgation of industry effluent limitations. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Kalur, supra note 10, at 957.
118 604 F.2d at 245.

119 Id. at 246.
120 See S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 61, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 4386. The Senate Report focuses on good faith efforts by the discharger to
control pollution in order to earn an extension of the compliance deadline. Id.
121 604 F.2d at 246. Neither the text of the 1977 FWPCA amendments nor the
Senate
Report specifically mention delay by the Administrator as a possible justification for granting an extension for compliance. In fact, courts have specifically refused to grant a judicial
waiver of the BPT July 1, 1977 deadline on the basis of late promulgation of the regulations.
E.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle, 581 F.2d 1228, 1231 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 909 (1979). Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1977)
(inability to meet deadlines not excused when reason for delay was industry's involvement
in litigation of the regulations).
122 604 F.2d at 246. Final effluent limitation regulations for the coal industry subcategories do not apply in Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, or Wyoming.
40 C.F.R. § 434.32(a) n.1 (1979); see 42 Fed. Reg. 21,381, 21,382-83 (1977).
123 604 F.2d at 246. Effluent limitations established under the FWPCA must be applied
to all point sources discharging pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1976). There is no provision
for exemption of any non-municipal point source from effluent limitation.
12, 604 F.2d at 246; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Section 553 describes the APA requirements for rulemaking. See Wright, supra note 25, at 380.
1215604 F.2d at 246; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976). Section 1251(e) provides for public
participation in the development and revision of any effluent limitation established by the
Administrator. The section of the FWPCA which outlines the requirements for establishment of effluent limitation guidelines specifically mentions that the EPA must afford the
opportunity for industry and public participation. 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (1976).
,26 604 F.2d at 249.
227 Id. at 247; see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1) (1976).
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geographic factors in establishing a subcategory. Therefore, the court
approved the EPA's segregation of western mines. 2 ' While the exclusion
of mines in western states did not alone amount to the creation of an
additional industry subcategory differentiated by geographic factors, the
Fourth Circuit interpreted the exclusion as an interim step in that
direction."1 Accordingly, the court approved the EPA's action pending
further study concerning creation of a new subcategory."80
In their administrative challenge, the industry petitioners claimed
that the final regulations did not convey adequate notice of the exclusion
of western coal mines."' 1 Without notice or an opportunity to comment on
the regulations, the petitioners asserted that the regulations were
violative of the notice and comment provisions of the APA, 1"' and the
participation requirement of the FWPCA.13s The 1976 interim rules'3
applied to all mines, and the Administrator's notice of proposed
rulemaking indicated that the EPA had considered geographic factors in
developing the interim limitations. 3 5 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit held
that the Administrator's procedures in promulgating the coal mining
industry regulations fully complied with the requirements of both the
APA and the FWPCA.I"
A notice of proposed rulemaking need not specify every detail of the
rule finally promulgated so long as the notice fairly apprises interested
persons of the subjects and issues before the agency."17 The 1975 notice
had adequately advised the industry of the factors to be considered. The
final regulations did not change the quality of effluent limitations for
western mines, but merely individualized the level of pollution each could
128 604 F.2d at 247.
129 Id. The EPA found, during the regulations comment period, that western coal mines
were able to discharge less concentrated pollutants than mines in the East. The EPA attributed this phenomenon to Western topography, geology, and mining technology. 42 Fed. Reg.
21,380, 21,382-83 (1977). The court noted that this data was sufficient to differentiate mines
in the named western states but insufficient to delimit a separate subcategory. 604 F.2d at
248.
22o 604 F.2d at 248. The court noted that exclusion of the western mines from the regulations did not exempt them from discharge limitation. Exemption would violate the
FWPCA. By excluding the mines, the Administrator simply authorized state and federal
NPDES permit issuers to set individualized effluent limitations for the mines until further
data could be developed for the entire subcategory. Id.

31 604 F.2d at 246.

132See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976); Wright, supra note 25, at 380.
12" See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976); note 125 supra.
134 41 Fed. Reg. 19,832, 19,836 (1976). The interim regulations included a notice of proposed rulemaking. The notice advised the industry that the EPA would consider geographic
location in the development of effluent limitations. Id.
135 40 Fed. Reg. 48,831 (1975). The court noted that the FWPCA itself served as additional notice that individual discharge permits might contain more stringent limitations if
conditions required. 604 F.2d at 248-49; see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (1976).
228 604 F.2d at 248.
137 Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977).
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discharge. The court determined, therefore, that the notice in this case
was adequate to apprise industry representatives of the EPA's intentions,
and that the regulations were not invalid due to lack of notice. ' s
Industry petitioners challenged the EPA's final regulations for the
subcategory of coal preparation plants and associated areas'1 9 as

impermissively vague. 140 Coal preparation plants are defined by the
regulations so as to be clearly considered point sources. 4 1 Associated

areas, however, include plant yards, access roads, and slurry ponds,1 42 and
the petitioners complained that the regulations failed to distinguish
between point sources and non-point sources.1 43 The FWPCA does not
require the EPA to promulgate regulations for non-point sources of
pollution,144 yet, according to the petitioners' interpretation of the
could be read to apply to surface
regulations, the point source regulations14'5
runoff from coal plant associated areas.
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the petitioners' vagueness complaints.246
The court held that when read in context, the challenged regulations
could not be interpreted to apply to surface runoff. Since the definition of
point source in the regulations conforms to the statute, the court found
no defect4 in the regulations and refused to invalidate them in the
1

abstract.

7

Non-industry petitioners in Consolidation Coal challenged the
exclusion from effluent limitation regulations of point source discharges
from inactive mines as arbitrary and capricious.1 4 ' The Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania complained that a lack of federal regulations on postmining discharges hinders the State's effort to regulate inactive mines.
The Commonwealth thus sought to compel uniform, federal regulation of
post-mining discharges. Industry petitioners joined the Administrator on
this issue, defending exclusion of post-mining activities.1 49
The Fourth Circuit agreed that the record supported petitioners'
138604 F.2d at 249.

See 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.20-22 (1979).
604 F.2d at 249.
,4140 C.F.R. § 401.11(d) (1979). The FWPCA regulations specify that a coal preparation plant is a facility where coal is prepared for transit to a consuming facility. Id. §
434.11(e).
14. Id. § 434.11(f).
143 604 F.2d at 249.
,44See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f) (1976) (Administrator to issue information, including guidelines for nonpoint sources).
145 604 F.2d at 250.
146 Id.
139

140

147

Id.

Id. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and several environmental groups sought to
compel the EPA to promulgate regulations for inactive surface mines during reclamation
and revegetation and for underground mines after coal production ceases. Id. Congress recognized the problem of polluted drainage from abandoned mines in passing the FWPCA.
The Act, however, requires only analysis of the problem, not development or application of
effluent limitations. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1314(f)(2)(B) (1976).
146

149 604 F.2d at 250.

646

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

claims that post-mining pollution abatement is an integral part of the
coal production process. 150 In upholding the Administrator's exclusion of
post-mining discharges, however, the court concluded that the
Administrator had created an active mining subcategory in the challenged
regulations.' 51 Referring to its own reasoning concerning the exclusion of
western mines, the court held the Administrator's decision to exclude
inactive mines from the point source regulations reasonable considering
the inadequacy of information available to the EPA.'52 The court noted,
however, that the Administrator can regulate post-mining discharges by
the issuance of permits, even though he has promulgated no national
industry standards.' 5'
In Consolidation Coal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed six actions of the
EPA Administrator
in promulgating water pollution
control
regulations.' 5 4 The Fourth Circuit had not previously considered the
specific environmental issues raised in ConsolidationCoal.155 Rather than
set aside regulations as incomplete or lacking in uniformity, the Fourth
Circuit chose to resolve ambiguities in favor of the Administrator by
considering industry facilities excluded from the regulations to be
separate subcategories. 15 The court's creative approach to the issues
150 Id. Because mining changes the drainage characteristics of the land so dramatically,
pollution from mining sites may continue indefinitely even after mining operations have
ceased. Id. at 251.
5I Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 434.11(d) (1979). In these regulations, the Administrator defined
a coal mine as an active mining area and specifically excluded surface mining areas that had
been graded in preparation for reclamation. Id. § 434.11(b) (1979).
12 604 F.2d at 252. The Consolidation Coal court conceded that techniques for reducing pollution from inactive mines are generally known in the industry. Id. In addition to
technical data and public comments, however, the EPA must consider the total cost of BPT
in each industry subcategory. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). The court also cited the
need for cooperation between the Administrator and the Secretary of the Interior in the
enforcement of mining regulations under the FWPCA and the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. 1 1977) as a justification for approving the Administrator's failure to promulgate regulations for inactive mine point sources.
604 F.2d at 252.
153 604 F.2d at 252; see 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976); United States Steel Corp. v.
Train, 556 F.2d 822, 844 (7th Cir. 1977).
'" 604 F.2d at 244-53. The sixth regulatory challenge concerned the construction of the
catastrophic rainfall exemptions for the coal mining point source category. Non-industry
petitioners sought to have those provisions conform to similar rainfall exemptions for other
industries. Id. at 253. The regulations challenged were 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.22(b), 434.32(b), and
434.42(b) (1978). After oral argument in ConsolidationCoal, the Administrator clarified the
catastrophic rainfall provisions. The revised final regulations, promulgated in 44 Fed. Reg.
2590 (1979), are currently codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 434.22(b), 434.32(b), and 434.42(b) (1979).
The revision of the regulations disposed of the petitioners' challenge. 604 F.2d at 254.
"' The Fourth Circuit had not previously considered the question of receiving water
quality, or the creation of separate industry subcategories for western mines and post-mining activities. The court had considered environmental issues for other industry categories
however. See, e.g., National Crushed Stone Ass'n v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111 (4th Cir. 1979); E.I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1976); see text accompanying
notes 40-64 supra.
16' Cf. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 307 (3d Cir. 1977). The Third

